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Cultural representations of Alzheimer’s disease typically focus on the social 
and emotional burdens felt by family and friends, diluting or excluding the 
experience of the sufferer. This article demonstrates how narrative fiction may 
help us to engage with the experiences of individuals with Alzheimer’s disease 
by imagining what it might be like to suffer from the disease ourselves. 
Demonstrating the humanized and subjective understanding of Alzheimer’s 
disease articulated in Olivia Rosenthal’s (2007) On n’est pas là pour 
disparaître [We’re Not Here to Disappear (2015)] this article also exposes the 
limitations of narrative fiction as a means of highlighting our own ignorance in 
the face of others’ experiences. 
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Understanding Alzheimer’s Disease 
 
The most common form of dementia, Alzheimer’s disease refers 
specifically to the presence of neurofibrillary tangles and beta-amyloid 
plaques in the brain that prevent the successful functioning of neurons or 
nerve cells and have a profound effect upon information-processing and 
behavior in an individual. Although most commonly associated with 
memory loss due to the initial degeneration of neurons in the 
hippocampus, Alzheimer’s eventually results in the functional loss of a 
number of other areas of the brain and leads to unpredictable changes in 
mood and behavior, loss of physical co-ordination and orientation, rising 
anxiety and paranoia, and often aphasia, or the loss of language and 
communication. Alzheimer’s Disease International (2015) estimates that 
by 2030, there will be nearly 75 million people living with the disease 
around the world, rising to well over 130 million in 2050. The 
concentration of the disease, focused in the last century on Europe and 
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North America, faces surging incidence particularly in Asia, in line with 
increased life expectancy and population numbers (Alzheimer’s Disease 
International, 2015). Alzheimer’s disease is now one of the leading 
concerns for policy makers across the world, with huge potential impacts 
upon political, social, and economic wellbeing, and with priority accorded 
to research and the reduction of recognized risk factors.  
Despite significant advances in the diagnosis and treatment of the 
disease over the last three decades, Alzheimer’s disease remains plagued 
by inconsistencies and misunderstandings. Sufferers or “victims” of 
Alzheimer’s are often stigmatized, dehumanized, and infantilized; their 
disease is described as “a complex, unknowable world of doom, ageing 
and a fate worse than death” (Zeilig, 2015, p. 17). Alzheimer’s, it is 
claimed, “obscures the distinction between life and death; [it is] a 
condition both of death-in-life and of life-in-death”; it is seen to be an 
excruciating process of “death in life, death before death, and never 
ending death” (Kaufman, 2006, pp. 23, 30). It is “Alzheimer’s: No cure, 
no hope, no help” (Kitwood, 1997, p. 54). In cultural representation, this 
stigma typically translates into the invisibility of the one with the disease; 
priority is accorded to the social and emotional burdens of caregiving and 
caregivers, while the person suffering from the disease itself is often 
placed “under erasure” (Burke, 2015, p. 29). Sociologist Karen A. Lyman 
(1989) has noted ironically that the augmented “interest in the ‘victims’ 
of [Alzheimer’s] generally does not include an interest in the perspective 
of the person with dementia,” who is viewed as “burdensome,” as a 
“stressor, not as one who is experiencing stress,” and that sufferers are 
depicted merely as “disease entities, independent variables” (p. 603). 
Even when the sufferer is accorded significance within cultural 
representation, it is through acts of reconstruction that attempt to 
remember the individual as they once were, rather than to understand who 
they are now.
1
 In this article, I want to bring back into focus the 
experiences of the sufferer by demonstrating how narrative fiction can 
help us to engage with unknown and undesirable events, subjectivities, 
and feelings, and to discuss the possibilities and limits of understanding 
Alzheimer’s disease.  
                                                        
1 See Burke (2008, p. 68). See also Fraser (2018). Fraser’s discussion of Paco Roca’s 
(2007) graphic novel Arrugas [Wrinkles, 2011] places the subjectivity of the sufferer at 
the centre of the narrative to show how “even those who seem unable to tell stories are 
narrating themselves long after many suppose they have stopped doing so” (p. 169). 
Fraser does not discuss the ethics of Roca’s work, however, placing the development of 
the narrative within a sequential, developmental framework of Alzheimer’s to which 
patients are expected to conform. 
 
NARRATIVE WORKS 9(2)      137 
 
 
Through a discussion of Olivia Rosenthal’s (2007) On n’est pas là 
pour disparaître (2007) [We’re Not Here to Disappear (2015)], I suggest 
that narrative fiction may enhance our understanding of individuals with 
Alzheimer’s disease by enabling us to imagine what it might be like to 
suffer from the disease ourselves, to consider the disease from the 
perspective of the person with dementia, and see the world through their 
eyes. Brute scientific facts and medicalized statistics do not, after all, 
offer any experiential insight that can help us to relate to the world around 
us, and it is only through artistic storytelling practices that we are able to 
gain a sense of experience as it is lived by ourselves and others. Narrative 
fiction, in other words, helps us to gain a sense of what political and 
cultural theorist Raymond Williams (1977) calls “structures of feeling,” 
which comprise a sense of “what is actually being lived, and not only 
what it is thought is being lived” (p. 131). Rosenthal’s We’re Not Here 
calls attention to these structures of feeling, encouraging us to imagine 
Alzheimer’s disease by demonstrating not how narrative can rebuild the 
past, but how it can show our own potentially shattered and diseased 
futures.  
I begin by exploring how fiction can open up “spaces of 
possibilities” (Meretoja, 2018, p. 2) in which we can imagine ourselves 
and others as they could be otherwise. Through “exercises,” the narrator 
invites the reader into the world of Monsieur T., a 74-year-old man 
thrown into the tangled cognitive disarray of Alzheimer’s disease, inciting 
us to imagine the world through his eyes. In these comparative exercises, 
Rosenthal facilitates the reader’s understanding of the disease by 
assimilating the unknown experience into our own comprehension of the 
everyday world. However, Rosenthal’s work also navigates a fraught 
ethical limitation that inhibits the unassailability of narrative as a way of 
making sense of experience. Alzheimer’s disease is a non-narrative 
experience, and to give it narrative form imposes an artificial framework 
grounded in concepts and language that resist translation from the healthy 
to the demented mind. Rosenthal’s awareness of the limitations of 
imagination is reflected in the narrative’s careful negotiation of the 
experience of Alzheimer’s disease as essentially lacking in some way. 
Through this negotiation, Rosenthal informs our understandings of the 
complexities of representing dementia in literature. While narrative 
fiction may provide a valuable resource for understanding lives and 
experiences that are different from our own, it is important to consider its 
limitations and the ways in which narrative fiction may inhibit 
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understanding in order to highlight our own ignorance in the face of 
others’ experiences. 
 
Narrative Fiction and Narrative Imagination 
 
In the epilogue to his memoir, Anonymously Yours, former teacher 
and young-adult novelist Richard Peck (1991) concludes with a poem 
written to inspire his young audience: 
 
I READ: because one life isn’t enough, and in the pages of a book I 
can be anybody; 
I READ: because the words that build the story become mine, to 
build my life; 
I READ: not for happy endings but for new beginnings; I’m just 
beginning myself, and I wouldn’t mind a map; 
I READ: because I have friends who don’t, and young though they 
are, they’re beginning to run out of material; 
I READ: because every journey begins at the library, and it’s time 
for me to start packing; 
I READ: because one of these days I’m going to get out of this 
town, and I’m going to go everywhere and meet everyone, 
and I want to be ready. (p. 120) 
 
Reading novels, Peck believes, is not only important for young 
people but for us all: “a novel is never an answer, always a question. Only 
very young writers or cranks or practice teachers believe their words will 
change the world. Instead, a novel raises questions about the way things 
are and asks us to rethink our position” (p. xi). To lose oneself in a good 
book means departing from oneself and one’s own world and entering—
temporarily—into the world, the body, the life of another, leaving behind 
one’s own worries and certainties and being transported into 
circumstances that we would never otherwise know. From an ethical 
perspective, storytelling does not simply fill the gaps in our hectic lives 
but feeds our “ability to imagine what the experience of another might be 
like” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 97). It is this ethically important relationship 
between narrative fiction and what philosopher Martha Nussbaum terms 
“narrative imagination” that is at the heart of this discussion.  
In Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities, 
Nussbaum (2010) contends that “citizens cannot relate well to the 
complex world around them by factual knowledge and logic alone” (p. 
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95), and that we must look to the humanities in order to cultivate a 
“humanistic and critical” (p. 94) understanding of the world. Learning 
facts and functions does not teach students how to interpret, assess, and 
appreciate information, and what Nussbaum terms “global citizenship” (p. 
93) depends upon the development of children’s—and adults’—narrative 
imagination.  
 
[Narrative imagination is] the ability to think what it might be like 
to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself, to be an 
intelligent reader of that person’s story, and to understand the 
emotions and wishes and desires that someone so placed might 
have. (pp. 95–96) 
 
Nussbaum argues for the centrality of literature and the arts in the 
education of our empathetic sensibilities; consequently, narrative fiction 
is not distinct from the real world but bound up with our everyday actions 
and reactions. Literature challenges our approaches to the world as we 
know it by raising questions and helping us to envisage how things could 
be otherwise, and academic discussion increasingly points to the value of 
literature in influencing how we perceive and react to the world around us 
and the people in it. In particular, literary scholar Hanna Meretoja (2018) 
argues that narrative fiction influences what she calls our “sense of the 
possible” (p. 2) by enlarging and diminishing the “spaces of possibilities” 
in which we “think, experience, feel, do, and imagine” (p. 183). By 
simulating experiences beyond our own lives, the worlds we encounter in 
narrative fiction may even influence and transform our actions in the 
“real” world. Mary Warnock (1972), in her introduction to Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s (1940/1972) The Psychology of Imagination, writes that our 
power to act in the world is a result of our ability to “envisage a given 
situation as possibly being otherwise than how it is” (p. xvii). If one could 
not imagine that  
 
his life might be different, he would have neither motive nor 
capacity for remedying his situation. Merely to experience 
something as given is not enough. One must have the power of 
imagining it as well as perceiving it; that is, of imagining it 
otherwise. (p. xvii) 
 
In developing our ability to imagine the otherwise and the not-yet, 
narrative fiction awakens us to possibilities that influence how we think 
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and act in the “real” world, and it is particularly useful for imagining not 
only potentially beneficial, optimal, or ideal scenarios, but also 
undesirable events, experiences, and futures. 
Although the appeal of narrative fiction arrives, typically, from 
the positive and self-aggrandizing possibilities that are opened up to us as 
readers—we become the celebrated hero or heroine of the story who 
overcomes adversity to reach his or her “happily ever after”—narrative 
fiction is also an invaluable tool to imagine negative or unpleasant 
possibilities, such as war, loss, heartbreak, or illness. Nussbaum (2010) 
suggests that reading narrative fiction may help us to address what she 
terms “cultural blind spots,” lives and experiences that are completely 
foreign or unknown to us and that are “likely to be dealt with ignorantly 
and obtusely” (pp. 106–107). Dementia and Alzheimer’s disease are such 
cultural blind spots, hemmed into our cultural imagination by stereotypes 
of aging, old age, and cognitive impairment. We have already seen how 
the experience of the Alzheimer’s sufferer him- or herself is often side-
lined, with narrative priority given to the social and emotional devastation 
of family and friends so that “the consequences of caring for someone 
with dementia and its impact upon familial relationships is placed at the 
center of the narrative rather than at its periphery” (Burke, 2015, p. 33). 
However, narrative fiction may provide a point of entry into a disease that 
is fast becoming a primary concern for policy makers around the world by 
helping us to imagine dementia from the inside, “to see the world through 
the eyes of others” (Blackman, cited in Cain, 2014) and walk in their 
shoes for awhile.
2
 From both an ethical and an epistemological 
perspective, narrative fiction potentially promotes a productive 
engagement with Alzheimer’s disease because it helps us to address areas 
of experience to which we are typically ignorant. In Rosenthal’s We’re 
Not Here to Disappear, the reader is invited to imagine the experience of 
Alzheimer’s disease as an experience that could be—or could become—
one’s own.  
 
Let’s Play a Game: Play and Possibility 
 
                                                        
2 Nussbaum’s philosophical approach can be seen in the work of teen and young-adult 
author Malorie Blackman, who has been criticized for her over-representation of under-
represented minorities. Blackman argues that “Books [allow] you to see the world 
through the eyes of others… Reading is an exercise in empathy; an exercise in walking 
in someone else's shoes for a while. So this is not about writing certain books for certain 
people, they should be read by everybody” (see Cain, 2014). 
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Rosenthal (2015) qualifies her work as fiction that reinvents and 
reimagines the lives and experiences of real people (p. 170). She tackles 
the disintegration of language, identity, and chronology that are 
archetypal of Alzheimer’s disease within the form and structure of the 
narrative itself, writing fragments of memory, slipping from one identity 
to another without warning, and telling stories that overlap and go 
backwards and forwards in time and place, all the while intersecting 
autobiography, biography, and fiction. The narrative begins with a clear 
indication of date, location, and identity and situates the surprising turn of 
events in which Monsieur T. has been found in the garden of his 
neighbours’ house after stabbing his wife. This precision soon 
deteriorates as Rosenthal enters the scattered psyche of an Alzheimer’s 
sufferer as relationships between father and daughter, husband and wife, 
and even between past and present selves fall apart.  
From a narrative hermeneutics approach, Rosenthal’s work is 
ethically and epistemologically valuable because it seeks to direct the 
reader towards an understanding of Alzheimer’s disease by actively 
manipulating our awareness of the subjectivity of perspective.
3
 Invited to 
follow the actions of the narrative from several different perspectives, we 
are encouraged to cultivate an empathetic response to the suffering of 
Monsieur T. while being simultaneously alerted to the unsurmountable 
alterity that divides the perspective of the demented sufferer from the 
perspective of the healthy mind. The chaotic narrative strives to highlight 
how the perspective of the one with Alzheimer’s disease is not only 
different from the perspective of those who do not have the disease, but 
how the perspective of the one with the disease changes over time. 
Rosenthal’s exploration is developed through her imaginative investment 
in the thoughts and understandings of the events from the perspective of 
Monsieur T. that shows how one singular event—the stabbing of Madame 
T.—must be reinterpreted from different perspectives if we are to make 
sense of the event and of the thoughts, actions, and feelings of those 
involved. In other words, the narrative highlights how facts alone do not 
tell us anything about the experience of Alzheimer’s disease; the text is 
engaged in exposing the cultural blind spot of Alzheimer’s disease by 
investing in the perspective of the sufferer and opening our eyes to the 
subjectivity of experience.  
The narrative begins with the presentation of basic facts to the 
reader—“On July 6, 2004, Monsieur T. stabbed his wife five times with a 
                                                        
3 See Brockmeier and Meretoja (2014) for an introduction to narrative hermeneutics, 
particularly in a medical context.  
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knife” (p. 5)—and with a disorienting police interrogation of the accused 
that plunges us into the “senselessness” (Malabou, 2012, p. 5) of 
Alzheimer’s disease:  
 
What’s your name? 
Not me. 
What’s your first name? 
It doesn’t belong to me.… 
What’s today’s date? 
I don’t know. 
Where are you? 
Next to you. 
In which city? 
Next to the river. 
Do you know the name of the river? 




In this initial introduction to the events and the characters, the 
subjectivities of demented and healthy minds are so disconnected that the 
narrative fails to reconcile any such understanding: the reader, like the 
policeman, is confused. If we are to consider narrative as a “practice of 
sense-making” that situates experience “as part of a meaningful, 
connected account” (Meretoja, 2018, p. 48), or as an intentional and 
agential representational process that structures events to imply 
“coherence, meaningfulness, and evaluative and emotional import” 
(Goldie, 2012, p. 8), then the narrative has only reinforced our belief that 
Alzheimer’s is non-sense. The perspectives of the policeman and of 
Monsieur T. are so disconnected that no clear temporal or spatial structure 
can be established: Alzheimer’s has “messed up” the narrative.
5
 As We’re 
Not Here progresses, however, we are invited to engage with the world 
and with the actions of Monsieur T. from his perspective and encouraged 
                                                        
4 It is worth noting that Rosenthal’s representation of the disease is highly informed. In 
many of these question-and-answer couplets between the police and the accused there is 
a clear sense that meaning is being portrayed indirectly rather than entirely at random, 
and that Monsieur T.’s communicative challenges involve frustrated processes of recall 
rather than of understanding as his responses continue to flesh out themes despite his 
fragmented recall of appropriate nouns (see Sabat, 2001, pp. 24–90). 
5 I refer to Peter Goldie’s (2012) The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind 
with this phrase, and to the process of “narrative thinking” as one which salvages or 
imposes order upon the chaotic and messy “happenstance” (p. 165) of our everyday 
lives.  
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to participate in his non-sense-making in our own process of making 
sense of Alzheimer’s. Within the safe space of the narrative, we are 
invited to imagine the performance of Monsieur T.’s actions as if they 
were our own and to reinterpret the events from his perspective without 
the ominous and terrifying reality of living with the disease ourselves.  
The narrative ends where it began, but this time through the 
narrator’s imaginative investment in the thought processes of Monsieur T. 
himself undertaking the act of stabbing his wife. It is an event enacted 
without premeditation or aggression, but appears to be the resolution of 
some unknown internal dilemma that spills out only distress, 
misunderstanding, sadness, and anger: 
 
it’s complicated… 
to be human… 
to understand or to hide when we don’t understand 
to be ingenuous or to hide when we aren’t 
to adjust or to hide when we don’t adjust 
to be furious without showing it 
to be sad without showing it 
to be alone without showing it 
to be here rather than elsewhere 
to be a prisoner 
it’s so complicated 
he picks up a knife on the table 
and since she keeps talking 
with words he doesn’t understand 
he erases her 
and erases himself with her 
to be a man 
it’s too complicated. (pp. 168–169, translation modified) 
 
Rosenthal’s narrative concludes where it began: via significant departures 
that engage in cultivating an imaginative encounter with a singular 
experience from multiple perspectives, including Monsieur T.’s wife’s, 
his consultant’s, and the narrator’s, but it is by imagining the thoughts and 
actions of Monsieur T. from his perspective—and in so doing humanizing 
and subjectively personalizing them—that the narrative invites us to 
reconceptualize “person-with-DEMENTIA” as “PERSON-with-
dementia” (Kitwood, 1997, p. 7). 
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We’re Not Here corresponds, therefore, to what Nussbaum (2010), 
following pediatrician and psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott, calls a “play 
space” that nourishes and extends our capacity for empathy:  
 
Through the imagination … we are able to develop our ability to 
see the full humanness of the people with whom our encounters in 
daily life are especially likely to be superficial at best, at worst 
infected by demeaning stereotypes. And stereotypes usually 
abound when our world has constructed sharp separations between 
groups, and suspicions that make any encounter difficult. (p. 107)  
 
The notion of play in narrative fiction is ethically and epistemologically 
valuable because it helps to reduce the experiential distance between “us” 
and “them,” or in this case between “healthy” and “demented,” that 
allows the reader to imagine otherwise. Rosenthal’s narrative fiction has 
the potential to change our views towards individuals with Alzheimer’s 
disease by challenging our stereotypical attitudes towards dementia and 
helping us to engage with the singularity of each subject’s experience of 
the disease in its individuality. This approach to Alzheimer’s disease and 
its sufferers is an attempt to illuminate the humanness of the demented 
other in order to engage in an ethical understanding of self as other that 
will facilitate the uncomfortable encounter with our own potentially 
demented future selves.  
We’re Not Here is not only engaged in this humanized and 
subjective understanding in an attempt to reassess our approaches to 
sufferers of Alzheimer’s disease, but in an attempt to familiarize 
ourselves with a possible unwelcome future in which we too are 
affected—directly or indirectly—by the disease: “The goal of this book is 
for me to get used to the idea that I could one day be suffering from A.’s 
disease, or that, even more terrible, the person with whom I live could 
suffer from it” (Rosenthal, 2015, p. 9). Rosenthal’s investment in the 
humanness of people with Alzheimer’s is not only aimed at furthering our 
empathetic understanding of the disease but in drawing the disease into a 
possible future that has a direct and inextricable link with our present. 
Philosopher Catherine Malabou (2012) writes that “A person with 
Alzheimer’s disease … is not … someone who has ‘changed’ or been 
‘modified,’ but rather a subject who has become someone else” (p. 
15).Throughout Rosenthal’s text, the narrative voice alternates among 
first-, second-, and third-person, so that the disease is experienced from 
different perspectives. The central event returns in the narrative, mediated 
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through different voices and perspectives that tend to transform without 
warning: “I pierce her, she screams, why is she screaming like this, the 
noise hurts, I don’t stop” (p. 18, emphasis added); “That morning, he 
knew he was going to / either kill her or sell the house / kill her or sell the 
house / I’m going to kill her or sell the house” (p. 25, emphasis added). In 
the act of reading, we are constantly thrown from one perspective to 
another, and this disorientation is not only ethically significant in 
cultivating our capacity to imagine otherwise but has epistemic 
significance in reproducing the self-fragmentation common to 
Alzheimer’s disease. Indeed, the narrator herself alternates between first- 
and second-person voice, failing to reconcile certain events as part of a 
continuous and unified life: “You’d never have thought that one day your 
father could mistake you for his wife” (p. 24, emphasis added). The 
narrator’s own confusion over her identity is a mark of the ways in which 
she attempts to come to terms with a possible future in which the disease 
will have truly made its impact upon her ability to connect past and 
present selves. 
It is possible to suggest, therefore, that the narrator plays the part 
of the Alzheimer’s sufferer, experimenting “with the idea of otherness in 
ways that are less threatening than the direct encounter with another 
might often be” to develop “invaluable practice in empathy and 
reciprocity” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 99). This imaginative power is not 
without forfeit, however, as the narrator’s playful entry into the mind of 
Monsieur T. begins to warp her sense of self, blurring the boundaries 
between fiction and reality, self and other, present and possible future. As 
the narrative comes to life, the disease spreads, a self-fulfilling prophecy 
for the superstitious narrator whose own body revolts against her writing: 
“Writing on A.’s disease hurts me” (Rosenthal, 2015, p. 33). At various 
intervals, the readers, too, are invited to enter into this dangerous game 
and to enlarge their own “sense of the possible … of how things could be 
otherwise” (Meretoja, 2018, p. 4) through guided exercises in 
imagination. For example: 
 
Do an exercise.  
Imagine that old and sick, you are put in a retirement home, that 
nobody ever comes to see you, those who might have being 
already dead and buried.  
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Do an exercise.  
Imagine yourself in the place of the one whose life story has been 
swallowed up.  
Imagine yourself at the dinner table, unaware of what you’re 
eating, of where you are, of the objects around you, of the 
strangers chatting to you like friends. (p. 109, translation 
modified) 
 
These exercises play with our “sense of the possible” by positioning us as 
the one with the disease, entering into the perspective of a person with 
Alzheimer’s disease and seeing the world through his or her eyes: 
 
It’s by doing exercises like this that we end up getting interested 
in A.’s disease and almost manage to enter into the minds of those 
affected. In fact, anxiety decreases as we enter, as we enter into 
their minds. (p. 60, translation modified) 
 
The playful familiarity of these childlike role-play exercises connects “the 
experiences of vulnerability and surprise to curiosity and wonder, rather 
than to crippling anxiety” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 101). As readers, we are 
engaged in the exploration of our own possibilities through playful 
interactions that reduce the intimidating encounter with one’s own 
otherness by assimilating the experience of Alzheimer’s disease into our 
everyday realities.  
However, one wonders if in “playing” the part of the person with 
Alzheimer’s disease we are not overstepping the ethical boundaries of 
imagination. Can the healthy mind really imagine the thoughts, actions, 
and experiences of the demented mind? Are we not merely reproducing 
and re-enacting established stereotypes of cognitive impairment? 
Rosenthal’s comparative exercises aim to help us imagine otherwise, 
grounded in the language and experiences with which we are familiar, but 
Alzheimer’s disease unsettles this familiarity. Can we even say that it is 
possible for the healthy mind to imagine the demented mind? Moreover, 
in the case of Alzheimer’s disease, a disease notoriously labelled 
unspeakable, inconceivable, and taboo, is it truly ethically or 
epistemologically viable to “narrate” at all? And if the experience cannot 
be narrated, how can narrative be used to help us imagine? While 
narrative fiction may help us to imagine the world from the perspective of 
another and to empathetically respond to experiences as if they were our 
own, our ability to imagine and to understand may not depend upon the 
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fulfilment of traditional narrative structures but rather upon the 
interruption of narrative and imagination at the limits of understanding.  
 
“An Experience without Words”: Narratives of Non-Sense 
 
In Dementia Reconsidered: The Person Comes First, psychologist 
Tom Kitwood (1997) observes that 
 
It is impossible … to enter fully into the experiential frame of 
another person, simply because each person is unique. In relation 
to dementia there are additional problems …. No one has returned 
from this particular journey of cognitive impairment in order to 
tell us what it is like. We are far more dependent on inference than 
in most ventures in intersubjectivity. Also, there is an essential 
contradiction. If we try to describe the experience of dementia in 
ordinary prose, we are using the calm, detached and highly 
ordered vehicle of language in order to convey impressions of a 
state of being that is often fragmented and turbulent. Furthermore, 
we are attempting to capture in concepts what it may be like to 
live in a subjective world where concepts are not holding up any 
more. The further we go into the domain of severe cognitive 
impairment, the more serious does this problem become. (p. 71)
 
 
This, I would argue, is the ethical challenge facing Rosenthal’s work—
and any work that treats dementia and Alzheimer’s disease. In We’re Not 
Here, the narrator’s exercises translate the unknowable world of 
Alzheimer’s disease into everyday concepts that aim to facilitate the 
reader’s comprehension of the unfamiliar experience, but we cannot know 
that these everyday concepts still pertain to the perspective of the one 
with the disease. Our attempts to understand Alzheimer’s disease are 
caught between the distinct subjectivities of healthy and demented minds, 
and a realistic portrayal of dementia must depart from comprehensible 
narrative traditions in such a way that it will inevitably alienate the 
reader’s attempts to understand. To realistically and empathetically 
portray Alzheimer’s disease means to use language that has been 
fragmented, that is falling apart, that is, by its very nature, unreadable and 
incomprehensible, and that will invariably problematize our processes of 
understanding. Or, to rephrase Elie Wiesel’s famous dictum about the 
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Nazi camps: a narrative of Alzheimer’s disease is either not a narrative or 
not about Alzheimer’s disease.
6
  
I would suggest, however, that this is precisely what Rosenthal’s 
self-conscious narrative tries to show. Rosenthal is fully aware of the 
inherent incompletion that pervades any attempt at sense-making in the 
context of Alzheimer’s disease, and although the narrator endeavors to 
transform her understanding—and ours—by adopting the perspectives of 
those around Monsieur T., and even of the sufferer himself, she concedes 
that “We can’t really recount Monsieur T.’s life in full. His testimony is 
missing” (p. 166). To understand the experience of Alzheimer’s disease is 
to realize that it cannot be understood and to carefully negotiate the 
potential of narrative to challenge our belief in this understanding: 
 
The experience of meaninglessness is absolutely mute, it’s an 
experience without words. No one can give an account of it, at 
least no one who is actually in a position to do so, I mean the 
people blessed with speech. Sick people can’t talk about their 
illnesses because they don’t have the words, and the healthy 
because they do have them. Writing about A.’s disease is by 
nature doomed to failure. (p. 70, translation modified) 
 
Alzheimer’s disease cannot be reconciled with coherent narrative, but in 
this failure to portray and represent we learn something about the 
incommunicability of the disease and of the impossibility of ever fully 
entering into the subjective experiences of others. Rosenthal’s narrative 
sense-making practice is a non-sense-making practice that attempts to 
reveal something of the incomprehensibility of Alzheimer’s disease by 
frustrating our engagement with the other and his or her experience. The 
experiential void that separates healthy from demented minds may be 
insurmountable, but by pointing to this gap in our understanding we learn 
more about the disease as an experience that lies beyond our powers of 
imagination. Meretoja (2018) argues that “it is easier to take the 
perspective of someone whose experiences are richly articulated in a 
language that sets our imagination alight, and considerably more difficult 
to take the perspective of someone whose experiences remain 
inexpressible” (p. 128), and in the case of narratives of Alzheimer’s 
                                                        
6 A number of variations on this dictum are in circulation, including—but not limited 
to—“A novel about Auschwitz is not a novel, or else it is not about Auschwitz” (Wiesel, 
cited in Rosenfeld, 1980, p. 14), and “A novel on Majdanek is either not a novel or not 
about Majdanek” (Wiesel, cited in Sicher, 2005, p. x). 
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disease, the inexpressibility of the perspective of the one with the disease 
translates into a disruptive block to our understanding that can be used to 
convey a sense of our enduring incomprehension. These challenges to 
narratives of Alzheimer’s disease, both ethically and epistemologically, 
are also their most valuable substance.  
I have suggested that Rosenthal’s work is useful in two ways: 
first, in its attempts to help us imagine the world from the perspective of 
someone different from ourselves through the cultivation of our narrative 
imagination, and, second, in the ways it obstructs the reader’s definitive 
understanding by failing to present a full narrative that would make sense 
of nonsense. Narrative fiction has ethical and epistemological value in the 
ways it not only helps us to make sense of the world but in the ways in 
which it helps us to realize that the world, life, and all its associated 
experiences, events, and feelings cannot always be made sense of, that 
nonsense abounds, and that life does not conform to the structure of a 
good book.
7
 Irmela Marei Krüger-Fürhoff (2015) has noted the 
differences that separate autobiographical writing on Alzheimer’s disease 
from fictional writing, arguing that autobiographical writing, such as 
Thomas DeBaggio’s (2000) Losing My Mind: An Intimate Look at Life 
with Alzheimer’s, aims not at “exploring the breakdown of language but 
rather at documenting the survival of [a] coherent narrative self” (p. 96). 
For the one with the disease, autobiographical narrative presents a means 
of holding on to a sense of self, of resisting the self-effacing threat of 
becoming “de-storied” when we can no longer remember or articulate 
who we are (Eakin, 2004, p. 123). Narrative fiction, on the other hand, 
can “go beyond” autobiography by allowing us to enter into the world of 
the afflicted characters in all their frailty and vulnerability to imagine 
their experience as it could one day be our own (Krüger-Fürhoff, 2015, p. 
96). Narratives of Alzheimer’s disease, such as We’re Not Here, should 
not fill us with optimism or give structure to the unstructured internal 
experience of the disease but rather articulate the fragility of the human 
condition, exposing the reader to the vulnerabilities and non-senses that 
may lie in our future encounters.  
 
                                                        
7 Goldie (2012) writes that “the simple fact about life is that ‘stuff happens.’ Life is 
messy” (p. 167) that many things in the world and even in our own lives remain 
unexplained and incomprehensible, that experience cannot always be understood, and 
that the temptation “to seek a narrative that neatly ties all the ends together” risks 
oversimplifying the intricate complexities and imprecisions of life and the mind (pp. 
167–173). 
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